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Abstract
Planned introductions of genetically modified crop varieties can be troublesome to
model. Estimation of demand and supply equations is not feasible due to lack of data. Further,
specifying demand and supply equations requires calibration to a presumed equilibrium.
Depending on the point chosen, highly questionable results may be obtained. We propose a
model that uses existing supply, demand, and elasticity estimates. The approach relies on
composite supply and demand functions. These composite functions are linear combinations of
GM and non-GM varieties. We then employ this approach in a model of world wheat trade to
analyze the impact of several plausible GM wheat adoption and consumer acceptability
scenarios.
Keywords: international trade, genetically modified organisms, producer surplus, consumer
surplus, welfare, transportation costiv
Highlights
Given recent controversies regarding genetically modified (GM) commodities found in
U.S. food products and the reluctance of importers of U.S. commodities to accept GM varieties,
the introduction of new GM crops appears troublesome. This is particularly so when the crop,
such as wheat, is intended primarily for human consumption. Although not yet available, GM
wheat varieties are scheduled to be available as early as the 2002 or 2003 growing season. These
first releases, as with other GM crops, will be tolerant to glyphosate herbicide. Glyphosate-
tolerant wheat increases the flexibility of herbicide application timing and the ability to control a
wide range of weed species, both broadleaves and grasses. While herbicide-tolerant wheat
varieties offer U.S. producers improved weed control, there is enormous downside potential to
GM wheat introductions. There is potential for lost access to some markets and profits. This
downside is magnified if the U.S. grain handling system is unable to maintain segregation of GM
and non-GM varieties of the same commodity. The smallest detected levels of GM material can
cause an entire shipment to be rejected by an end-user. A loss of confidence in the ability of the
United States to segregate GM and non-GM wheat could shut all U.S. producers out of many
overseas markets. Importers, fearing contamination within the grain handling and transportation
system, will simply purchase wheat from non-GM producing countries. The end result would be
that all U.S. producers could suffer large losses.
What remains unclear is how U.S. producers will be affected by the introduction of GM
wheat varieties. Production costs, consumer acceptability, and the response of competing wheat-
producing countries are all factors in the ultimate outcome of producer welfare. Further,
consumers have the potential to gain or lose welfare due to these introductions. A lower cost of
production wheat variety should result in lower consumer prices, but consumers, both domestic
and foreign, benefit only if there is some acceptability of products made from GM wheat.
Otherwise, some consumers may lose welfare if production shifts to less desirable, i.e., GM,
varieties.
Here we develop a mathematical programming model of the international market for
wheat. GM wheat is introduced in the United States and other countries. The results indicate that
U.S. producers stand to gain considerably due to GM introductions, assuming a 4.8% costs
savings for GM vs. non-GM wheat. In most scenarios considered, U.S. producers would gain
from adopting GM wheat. Only in the most widespread adoption scenarios do U.S. producers
suffer from GM wheat introductions.
The results also indicate that foreign consumers, particularly in lesser-developed
countries, would be the largest beneficiaries of GM wheat introductions. U.S. consumer welfare
is relatively unchanged in the worst-case scenario, but generally improved in all other scenarios.*Eric A. DeVuyst and Cheryl S. DeVuyst are Assistant Professors in the Department of
Agribusiness and Applied Economics, and Won W. Koo is Director and Professor and Richard
D. Taylor is Research Associate in the Center for Agricultural Policy and Trade Studies at North
Dakota State University, Fargo.
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*
Given recent controversies regarding genetically modified (GM) commodities found in
U.S. food products and the reluctance of importers of U.S. commodities to accept GM varieties,
the introduction of new GM crops appears troublesome. This is particularly so when the crop,
such as wheat, is intended primarily for human consumption. Although not yet available, GM
wheat varieties are scheduled to be available as early as the 2002 or 2003 growing season. These
first releases, as with other GM crops, will be tolerant to glyphosate herbicide. Glyphosate-
tolerant wheat increases the flexibility of herbicide application timing and the ability to control a
wide range of weed species, both broadleaves and grasses. While herbicide-tolerant wheat
varieties offer U.S. producers improved weed control, there is enormous downside potential to
GM wheat introductions. There is potential for lost access to some markets and profits. This
downside is magnified if the U.S. grain handling system is unable to maintain segregation of GM
and non-GM varieties of the same commodity. The smallest detected levels of GM material can
cause an entire shipment to be rejected by an end-user. A loss of confidence in the ability of the
United States to segregate GM and non-GM wheat could shut all U.S. producers out of many
overseas markets. Importers, fearing contamination within the grain handling and transportation
system, will simply purchase wheat from non-GM producing countries. The end result would be
that all U.S. producers could suffer large losses.
What remains unclear is how U.S. producers will be affected by the introduction of GM
wheat varieties. Production costs, consumer acceptability, and the response of competing wheat-
producing countries are all factors in the ultimate outcome of producer welfare. Further,
consumers have the potential to gain or lose welfare due to these introductions. A lower cost of
production wheat variety should result in lower consumer prices, but consumers, both domestic
and foreign, benefit only if there is some acceptability of products made from GM wheat.
Otherwise, some consumers may lose welfare if production shifts to less desirable, i.e., GM,
varieties.
Accurately modeling planned introductions is difficult. In a typical trade model,
researchers specify systems of demands and supplies for each country and each commodity.
Then, estimate relevant elasticities or rely on published estimates. Using these elasticity
estimates and data on quantities and prices, demand and supply equation parameters are
calibrated. But with GM commodities, existing data may be insufficient to allow estimation even
for well-established GM corn and soybeans (Preckel et al.)  For planned introductions, data are
non-existent, as is the case for GM wheat. So, parameter values must be arrived at via fiat. After
obtaining parameter estimates, the question is what quantities and prices should be used to
calibrate demand and supply equations. These quantities and prices should represent an
equilibrium. In the case of planned introductions, equilibrium cannot be observed from historical2
observation. So, researchers are left to speculate, not only about elasticity values, but the
calibration point as well.
Preckel et al. propose primal/dual positive mathematical programming, an improved
version of positive mathematical programming (Howitt), to model changes in producer
profitability due to changes in export demand. This approach works well when at least one
observation on quantities and prices exists, but is less well-suited to the case of planned
introductions.
In this report, we develop a multinational trade model to consider the potential impacts of
GM wheat releases. Each country’s demand and supply are specified as  linear composites of
non-GM and GM wheat. In the composite functions, GM wheat quantities are multiplied by a
parameter to scale up or down the marginal cost of production and marginal utility of
consumption. Although these scaling parameters must still be arrived at by fiat, the model
provides a framework for assessing the trade and welfare impacts of GM crop introductions
without the need to estimate a new set of elasticities. Using this model, we then evaluate five
plausible scenarios to assess the trade and welfare impacts of GM wheat introductions.
Literature
Previous research (Falck-Zepeda et al. 2000a,b; Moschini et al.) on GM crops indicates
positive returns to consumers, producers, and GM developers. Falck-Zepeda et al. consider Bt
cotton (2000a,b) and herbicide-tolerant soybeans (2000a). In 1996 and 1997, U.S. farmers,
consumers, and rest-of-world (ROW) consumers all benefitted from U.S. adoption of Bt cotton.
ROW Producers suffered losses. In 1997, U.S. soybean growers in aggregate realized additional
profit from the adoption of herbicide-tolerant soybeans, but growers in Delta states suffered
losses. Consumers, both domestic and ROW, realized additional surplus. Under various adoption
scenarios, Moschini et al. show increases in U.S. producer surplus ranging from US$135 million
to US$396 million from the adoption of GM soybeans. Increases in U.S. consumer surplus range
from US$9 million to US$25 million. Increases in total world surplus range from US$804
million to US$2197 million.
Previous research concerning trade of GM products (Bredahl and Kalaitzandonakes;
Ballenger et al.; Kalaitzandonakes) concludes that markets have been able to handle market
segmentation issues. Bredahl and Kalaitzandonakes conclude that voluntary labeling has led to
segmentation of GM and non-GM markets. Ballenger et al. argue that this segmentation has had
little impact on supply and demand of GM crops. Kalaitzandonakes argues that markets are
insulated from GM introductions as food processors typically arrange for non-GM suppliers. In
markets with a non-GM preference, Bredahl and Kalaitzandonakes argue that domestic suppliers
or substitute inputs will be used.3
Model
A multinational/regional trade model for wheat is developed using GAMS (Brooke et
al.). Table 1 presents the 17 major wheat importing/exporting countries and regions included in
the model. All other countries are aggregated into the rest of the world (ROW). Also in Table 1,
five-year averages of production, consumption and net exports are given for “common” wheat.
Common wheat is a linear aggregation of wheat varieties used for baking, bread, noodles and
livestock feed and excludes durum wheat.
Table 1. Five-year Average Common Wheat Production, Consumption, Net Exports,  Income,














United States 61,287 31,547 29,433 23.96 275.19
Canada 22,661 7,050 13,852 17.83 31.31
EU 85,652 73,862 11,949 19.69 375.82
Australia 20,741 4,636 16,313 17.66 18.92
Argentina 12,960 4,636 8,335 2.23 36.90
Algeria 486 3,100 -2,650 2.80 32.16
Brazil 2,295 8,444 -6,115 0.80 175.94
China 112,135 114,943 -3,343 0.29 1,274.94
Egypt 5,792 12,562 -6,851 0.47 35.34
Japan 533 6,245 -6,053 38.34 126.46
S. Korea 8 3,790 -3,814 5.92 47.16
Mexico 3,283 5,064 -1,858 0.96 103.62
Morocco 3,164 5,154 -2,171 0.96 29.82
FSU 65,813 68,950 -2,880 4.20 295.90
Tunisia 89 878 -825 1.57 9.60
Taiwan 1 996 -992 10.11 22.13
Venezuela 0 863 -864 0.49 23.90
ROW 161,055 203,181 -40,980 1.39 3,054.96
Sources: Production, consumption, and net exports are from USDA/ERS. Income and population data
are from the International Monetary Fund. ROW Per capita income estimated as average of the nine


















Sj ' ej%fj@Pricerecj (4)
In the notation below, a subscript i denotes a consuming country or region. A subscript j
denotes a producing country or region.  In the model, each country i is assumed to have a
demand for wheat. Wheat is a composite good made from a linear combination of non-GM and
GM wheat, as in (1):





produced in country j of non-GM and GM wheat, respectively. Each country’s demand function
for the composite good is given as:
where   is the price paid by country i for the composite good and   is the per Pricepdi Incomei
capita national income of country i. The parameters  ,  and  represent intercept of the ai bi ci
demand function, price responsiveness, and income responsiveness, respectively. Demand
equation parameters are calibrated to elasticities and consumption and income data which are
discussed below. Since consumers may differentiate GM from non-GM wheat demands, the
marginal utility of GM wheat differs from the marginal utility of non-GM wheat by a factor of
. The parameter   can take any real, finite value. A value of zero indicates consumers are βi βi
completely adverse to consuming GM wheat products. A value of one indicates complete
acceptability. Any value between zero and one indicates a lower marginal utility of consumption
for GM wheat products, but if the price is sufficiently low, consumption can occur.
Similar to demand, each country j produces a composite good which is a linear
combination of non-GM and GM wheat. The composite good is given as:





GM and GM wheat produced by j and consumed by country i. The supply function of the
composite good is given as:
where   is the price received by country j for the composite good. The parameters   and  Pricerecj ej
 are the intercept and slope of the supply function. Data used to calibrate these parameters are fj
also discussed below. Equations (3) and (4) imply that producers of wheat may incur different
marginal costs of producing GM vs. non-GM wheat. The   parameter in (3) is strictly positive. αj
A value less than one indicates a lower marginal cost of production for GM wheat.1 Note, this does not require the sum of composite consumption good to equal the sum of
composite output. In fact, it will usually be the case that these two sums are not equal and, yet,
equilibrium will still be achieved. 


































j,i; œi,j; n0[non,GM]. (6)
The model does not explicitly solve for prices paid and received for composite goods.
Instead, we find these prices as marginal (i.e., shadow) prices of the composite goods produced
and consumed. The model objective is to maximize total consumer and producer welfare minus
transportation costs. This objective value is the sum of areas under the inverse of the composite
demand functions minus the sum of areas under the inverse of the composite supply functions
minus transportation costs, or:
The choice variables are quantities of GM and non-GM wheat consumed in each country and
quantities of GM and non-GM wheat produced in each country. Balance constraints are imposed
to insure the quantity of wheat, both GM and non-GM, exported from country j to country i
equals the quantity of wheat imported by country i from country j, or:
This also requires that the total amount consumed equals the total amount produced for both
non-GM and GM wheat.
1 The United States is allowed to import wheat from Canada. Otherwise,
exporting nations are constrained to consume only domestically produced grain. Importing
nations are constrained to produce for only their domestic markets, buy may import wheat from
any exporting country.
Data and Model Calibration
Data regarding production, consumption, net exports, population, and income are
reported in Table 1. Per capita income and population data are taken from the International
Monetary Fund. Wheat production, consumption, and net exports are from U.S. Department of
Agriculture, Economic Research Service. Consumption data are then adjusted to ensure that
production minus consumption equals net exports.
2 Distances between countries are taken from
the U.S. Defense Mapping Agency and are reported in Table 2. Distances from each port to
ROW are approximated by averaging the distance from each exporter to the four closest
importing countries. Data regarding ocean freight rates are taken from the International Grain
Council. 3 Actual average shipping cost from Canada to the United States is $14.50/MT, and
average shipping cost to Vancouver port is $9.20/MT. Since in-land shipping costs are not
included in the shipping costs for other countries, the relative cost, i.e., difference, is used.
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Table 2.  Distances in Miles between Various Countries and Ports
   United States                  Canada             Argentina Australia     EU    
Importer Gulf PNW Vancouver Thunder
Bay
Buenos Aires Brisbane Rotterdam
Algeria 5,206 8640 8,803   4,667  5,700    10,271   1,843  
Brazil 4676 7610 7,782   3,941  1,306    8,763   6,401  
China 10,210 5240 5,351   13,047  11,931    4,243   12,954  
Egypt 6,712 10,025 10,188   6,052  7,085    8,921   3,228  
Japan 9,265 4,155 4,262   11,621  11,066    3,925   12,070  
S.Korea 10,057 5,225 5,332   12,678  11,666    4,995   12,862  
Mexico 789 4,669 4,782   4,141  5,726    8,897   4,842  
Morocco 4,769 8,220 8,383   4,247  5,280    10,625   1,423  
FSU 5,331 9,180 9,271   4,532  6,798    12,520   970  
Tunisia 5,589 9,023 9,186   5,050  6,083    9,929   2,226  
Taiwan 10,708 4,755 4,863   13,545  12,229    5,310   13,430  
Venezuela 2,076 4,753 4,916   3,941  4,026    8,571   4,388  
ROW
* 6,282 6,785 6,927   7,431  7,408    8,081   6,386  
  Source: U.S. Defense Mapping Agency.  
  *Distances from ports to ROW are averages for each port.
Using 203 observations on transportation rates and distances, a log-linear relationship between
rate ($/MT) and distance (miles) is estimated. The resulting estimation is:
(7) log(rate) = 0.0515889 + 0.340405
* log(miles)
       (0.19201)      (0.05342)
R
2 = 0.16805 F-stat = 40.60183
*
(
*Significant at the 1% level).
where standard errors are given in parentheses. Using this estimated relationship and the data in
Table 2, estimated transportation costs are generated. These costs are given in Table 3.
Additionally, the United States is allowed to import wheat from Canada with a rail transportation
cost of $5.30 per MT
3 (Park and Koo).4 Exporters and importers typically each pay some portion of the transportation margin,
as the transportation cost acts essentially like a per unit tax. So, it is necessary to calibrate on
prices that include the transportation margin.
7
            Table 3. Estimated Transportation Costs 
Exporter
Importer United States Canada EU Argentina Australia
--------------------------------US$ per 1000 MT------------------------------
Algeria 19,397.482 18,679.430 13,614.634 19,995.092 24,433.059
Brazil 18,697.685 19,942.416 20,800.348 12,108.419 23,147.471
China 19,430.491 19,569.635 26,441.596 25,711.416 18,083.515
Egypt 21,138.996 20,407.139 16,476.438 21,531.771 23,288.705
Japan 17,954.962 18,111.040 25,812.994 25,061.061 17,610.262
S. Korea 19,411.540 19,545.953 26,377.521 25,515.577 19,116.342
Mexico 10,199.628 17,934.345 18,914.971 20,026.092 23,267.359
Morocco 18,817.411 18,089.317 12,467.275 19,480.855 24,716.520
FSU 19,544.705 18,493.716 10,942.507 21,230.808 26,136.644
Tunisia 19,861.685 19,187.735 14,518.412 20,442.662 24,153.020
Taiwan 18,798.588 18,942.856 26,768.407 25,928.246 19,518.463
Venezuela 14,177.694 17,634.666 18,291.553 17,763.227 22,973.566
ROW 15,255.992 17,942.342 12,885.707 18,582.146 17,336.898
   Table 4 presents the demand, supply, and income elasticities for each country/region.
These elasticities are from Benirschka and Koo. Supply and income elasticities for ROW are
estimated by averaging across lesser developed countries (Algeria, Brazil, China, Egypt, Mexico,
Morocco, the FSU, Tunisia, and Venezuela).
The base price for wheat is assumed to be $154/MT. Demand parameters are calibrated
using this base price plus one-half of average transportation costs across all exporting countries.
Supply parameters are calibrated using this base price minus one-half of average transportation
costs across all importing countries.
4 The calibrated parameters for demand and supply are given
in Table 5.8
                      Table 4. Demand, Supply, and Income Elasticities for Common Wheat
Country/Region Demand Supply Income
United States -0.059 0.220 0.358
Canada -0.125 0.104 0.389
EU -0.082 0.025 0.138
Australia -0.302 0.074 0.471
Argentina -0.179 0.165 0.433
Algeria -0.165 0.000 0.597
Brazil -0.148 0.185 0.297
China -0.072 0.037 0.233
Egypt -0.050 0.106 0.433
Japan -0.005 0.000 0.358
S. Korea -0.090 0.000 0.323
Mexico -0.034 0.059 0.883
Morocco -0.073 0.037 0.105
FSU -0.134 0.130 0.527
Tunisia -0.035 0.000 0.543
Taiwan -0.162 0.000 0.645
Venezuela -0.077 0.000 0.502
ROW -0.100 0.062 0.458
                       Source: Benirschka and Koo.9
Table 5. Calibrated Demand and Supply Parameters
Country                  Demand Parameters
*                       Supply Parameters
**  
abcef
United States 33,691.947 -0.012 1.730 47,803.860 0.088
Canada 9,800.681 -0.007 6.138 20,304.256 0.015
EU 79,719.582 -0.039 1.374 83,510.700 0.014
Australia 5,655.024 -0.009 6.242 19,206.166 0.010
Argentina 5,398.603 -0.005 24.337 10,821.600 0.014
Algeria 3,595.225 -0.003 20.791 486.000 0.000
Brazil 9,640.483 -0.008 17.746 1,870.425 0.003
China 123,771.311 -0.054 72.777 107,986.005 0.027
Egypt 13,191.366 -0.004 178.263 5,178.048 0.004
Japan 6,600.285 -2.1E-4 0.486 533.000 0.000
S. Korea 4,139.803 -0.002 4.422 8.000 0.000
Mexico 5,271.985 -0.001 45.635 3,089.303 0.001
Morocco 5,705.670 -0.003 19.568 3,046.932 7.6E-4
FSU 77,775.519 -0.060 29.129 57,257.310 0.056
Tunisia 894.292 -2.1E-4 32.929 89.000 0.000
Taiwan 1,124.924 -0.001 2.863 1.000 0.000
Venezuela 912.380 -4.3E-4 37.036 0.000 0.000
ROW 222,742.753 -0.132 21.780 151,141.170 0.064
*Demand equation parameters are a = intercept, b = price responsiveness, and c = income
  responsiveness.
**Supply equation parameters are e = intercept and f = price responsiveness.
Baseline and Counter-factual Experiments
For the baseline model, GM wheat is not produced (all αj>1) or consumed (all βi=0), so
all production and consumption is of non-GM wheat. The baseline production, consumption, and
surpluses are given in Table 6. These results are the basis for comparison for the counter-factual
experiments below. In Table 7, net exports under the baseline and counter-factual scenarios are
presented. 10













United States 60,513.00 31,961.89 7,861.54 41,853.84
Canada 22,484.60 8,891.42 3,048.10 5,528.30
EU 85,562.04 73,956.91 12,471.53 69,685.93
Australia 20,619.74 4,533.65 2,824.96 1,183.50
Argentina 12,808.35 4,683.71 1,690.46 2,040.34
Algeria 486.00 3,595.23 0.00 1,406.38
Brazil 2,298.27 8,400.40 323.46 4,365.45
China 112,294.42 115,158.54 17,613.14 122,813.76
Egypt 5,827.40 12,606.55 896.28 19,357.92
Japan 533.00 6,600.29 0.00 101,387.01
S. Korea 8.00 3,814.48 0.00 3,243.38
Mexico 3,284.71 5,139.46 495.13 11,635.75
Morocco 3,168.56 5,319.83 497.23 5,595.32
FSU 66,061.48 68,425.67 9,771.23 39,165.83
Tunisia 89.00 894.29 0.00 2,002.99
Taiwan 1.00 986.32 0.00 464.70
Venezuela 0.00 861.69 0.00 859.39
ROW 161,468.02 201,677.28 25,073.48 154,643.05
TOTALS 557507.59 557,507.59 82,565.86 587,232.8611
Table 7. Net Exports Under Baseline and Counter-factual Experiments
Country/
Region Baseline Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 Scenario 5
 ---------------------------------------------1000 MT ---------------------------------------------
United States 28,551.12 30,686.90 30,051.40 31,107.13 30,732.08 30,621.06
Canada 13,593.18 13,537.43 13,623.34 13,849.62 13,770.05 13,543.22
EU 11,605.12 11,389.30 11,167.16 11,034.55 12,632.07 11,392.98
Australia 16,086.09 16,010.36 15,932.42 15,885.87 16,266.00 16,011.65
Argentina 8,124.64 8,046.43 8,248.40 8,198.33 8,129.19 8,047.76
Algeria -3,109.23 -3,109.23 -3,109.23 -3,109.23 -3,109.23 -3,109.23
Brazil -6,102.13 -6,146.15 -6,161.62 -6,189.23 -6,227.35 -6,145.40
China -2,864.12 -3,192.75 -1,158.72 -1,363.48 -1,646.27 -3,187.15
Egypt -6,779.14 -6,806.86 -6,842.68 -6,866.01 -6,893.90 -6,804.87
Japan -6,067.29 -6,067.29 -6,067.29 -6,067.29 -6,067.29 -6,067.29
S. Korea -3,806.48 -3,815.55 -3,824.88 -3,830.46 -3,838.16 -3,815.39
Mexico -1,854.75 -1,871.12 -1,877.10 -1,880.44 -1,888.68 -1,847.99
Morocco -2,151.27 -2,164.63 -2,178.38 -2,186.59 -2,197.92 -2,164.40
FSU -2,364.19 -2,832.49 -3,314.52 -3,602.35 -3,999.88 -2,824.52
Tunisia -805.29 -805.29 -805.29 -805.29 -805.29 -805.29
Taiwan -985.32 -989.75 -993.93 -996.53 -1,000.14 -989.49
Venezuela -861.69 -864.65 -865.73 -866.33 -867.82 -864.54
ROW -40,209.26 -41,004.67 -41,823.37 -42,312.26 -42,987.45 -40,991.12
In Table 8, values of alpha and beta parameters are reported for five counter-factual
scenarios. Numerous articles discuss international concern about genetically modified crops and
food inputs, but little quantitative information is known about consumer willingness to pay for
genetically modified foods (Commandeur; Hoban 1997, 1999; McClusky; Zechendorf). As there
is little empirical evidence to suggest values for alpha and beta parameters, we use plausible
speculation, based on various data sources, to generate these values. In Scenario 1, we assume
that the United States adopts production of GM wheat while other exporters do not. (Subsequent
scenarios explore alternative adoption levels.) The marginal cost of producing GM wheat is
assumed to be 4.8% lower than non-GM wheat. This is based on cost of production data for
North Dakota wheat growers from the 1999 growing season. Herbicide costs for wheat on cash-
rented land averaged $11.36/acre and total direct expenses of $92.86/acre (North Dakota Farm5 Cost savings may be smaller if suppliers of GM wheat charge a technology fee, as is
done with corn and soybeans.
12
and Ranch Business Management). Taylor and Koo state that a single application of glyphosate
costs approximately $6.90/acre, a cost savings of $4.46/acre or 4.8% of direct costs.
5




* Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4
αj βi αj βi αj βi αj βi
United States 0.952 0.950 0.952 0.950 0.952 1.000 0.952 1.000
Canada  4
** 0.950 0.980 0.950 0.980 1.000  0.980 1.000
EU 4 0.000 4 0.000 4 1.000 0.980 1.000
Australia 4 0.000 4 0.000 4 1.000 0.980 1.000
Argentina 4 1.000 0.980 1.000 0.980 1.000 0.980 1.000
Algeria 4 1.000 4 1.000 4 1.000 4 1.000
Brazil 4 1.000 4 1.000 4 1.000 4 1.000
China 4 1.000 0.980 1.000 0.980 1.000 0.980 1.000
Egypt 4 1.000 4 1.000 4 1.000 4 1.000
Japan 4 0.000 4 0.000 4 1.000 4 1.000
S. Korea 4 0.000 4 0.000 4 1.000 4 1.000
Mexico 4 1.000 4 1.000 4 1.000 4 1.000
Morocco 4 1.000 4 1.000 4 1.000 4 1.000
FSU 4 1.000 4 1.000 4 1.000 4 1.000
Tunisia 4 1.000 4 1.000 4 1.000 4 1.000
Taiwan 4 1.000 4 1.000 4 1.000 4 1.000
Venezuela 4 1.000 4 1.000 4 1.000 4 1.000
ROW 4 1.000 4 1.000 4 1.000 4 1.000
*Parameter values for Scenario 5 are identical to Scenario 1 except that Mexico has   and is βi'0
 constrained to zero imports from the United States.
**Any alpha value greater than 1 will result in zero production of GM wheat.13
In Scenario 1, the beta parameters (i.e., consumer acceptability) for lesser developed
countries and Argentina are set to 1. This assumption follows Maslow’s hierarchy of needs
pyramid, which suggests that these populations are first motivated to satisfy basic physiological
needs for food (Senauer). Hence, by setting beta to1 for these countries, we assume they will
seek to feed their people at the lowest possible cost. Food safety concerns, including GM
acceptability, are secondary to their caloric needs. The acceptability of GM-derived foods by
U.S. consumers is high, despite recent recalls of food products tainted with GM commodities. In
a recent survey, only 2% of U.S. respondents expressed concern about GM-derived foods
(International Food Information Council Foundation) . This suggests that a large segment of
United States consumers is not concerned with GM foods. Based on these study results, we
choose a large beta, 0.95, for the United States. Hoban (2001) reports that perceived risks for
genetically modified foods are similar for the United States and Canada. So, we also set the beta
for Canada to 0.95. Other governments have been very reluctant to allow GM-derived foods.
Representatives from the Japanese wheat industry recently stated that they will purchase non-
GM wheat from U.S. competitors if the United States cannot ensure “GM-free” wheat (Gillam).
Commandeur states that Japanese consumers prefer traditional food products and have
previously paid premiums for a scarce traditional Japanese rice variety over importing rice from
Thailand. We therefore initially set beta to 0 for Japan. South Korea follows Japan in its
resistance to GM products. South Korea requires labeling of GM corn, soybeans, bean sprouts,
potatoes, and food products containing those inputs (Cho). South Korea was the first country to
restrict GM grains for animal consumption (Lence and Hayes). For these reasons, we initially set
beta to 0 for South Korea. While levels of resistance to GM food products vary between
countries of the European Union (EU), labeling regulations approved by the European
Commission in January 2000 set a 1% trigger for GM products (Dyhrkopp and Schaefer).
Because of this labeling restriction and steps taken by major European supermarket chains to
eliminate GM products from their store shelves (Isaac and Phillips), we initially set beta to 0 for
EU countries. The Australia and New Zealand Food Authority set GM labeling regulations after
two major supermarket chains removed GM products from their shelves (ANZFA). Initially beta
is set to 0 for Australia. 
In Scenario 2, we assume identical consumer acceptability to Scenario 1, but in addition
to the United States, allow Canada, Argentina, and China to produce GM wheat. These three
countries currently produce large quantities of other GM crops and currently are the second,
third, and fourth largest producers of GM crops. However, we assume that the cost savings these
countries receive is lower than that for U.S. producers. Herbicide costs and/or use in these
countries are often lower than in the United States (Taylor and Koo; United Nations, FAO). So,
their percent reduction in costs, which we set at 2%, will be less than for U.S. producers.
Scenario 3 is similar to Scenario 2 except we assume full consumer acceptability of GM wheat
products. Scenario 4 examines the impact of adoption by all exporting countries and China with
full world-wide consumer acceptance. The last simulation, Scenario 5, considers the impact of a
lost U.S. export market due to U.S. adoption of GM wheat.
Results
Results from counter-factual experiments are compared to baseline producer and
consumer surpluses from Table 6. Results for Scenarios 1 through 4 are reported in Tables 9 and
10. Results for Scenario 5 are reported in the text below. In Table 9, we report changes in14
welfare for producers and consumers in each country/region and in total for the world. In Table
10, we report GM production and consumption by country/region. When U.S. producers are the
only adopters of GM wheat in Scenario 1, they enjoy a competitive advantage over other
exporters, as a result of their lowered production costs. So, U.S. producer welfare increases,
while producers in all other countries/regions suffer lower welfare. In total, producer welfare
decreases by about US$1.7 billion, or about 2%. This is due primarily to the reduction in the
world price of wheat. These producer welfare losses are more than offset by the gains to
consumers worldwide. U.S. consumers suffer a slight decrease in welfare. Recall U.S. consumers
have a marginal preference for non-GM wheat over GM wheat. Under Scenario 1, over one-half
of the U.S. production shifts to GM wheat, effectively shifting the North American non-GM
wheat supply curve left. The result is a slight increase in U.S. domestic wheat price. All other
consumers benefit from the U.S. adoption of GM wheat. Increases in consumer surpluses total
US$2.1 billion, or almost 0.4%, due again primarily to the reduction in world wheat prices.
Interestingly, the net EU welfare change is about -US$47 million. The decrease in world
wheat prices harms EU producers. But, EU consumers benefit from these lower prices, even
though EU consumers do not consume any GM wheat under this scenario. The increase in EU
consumer surplus almost offsets the decrease in EU producer surplus. In fact, all consumers
outside the United States benefit from price reductions due to U.S. adoption.
Also of interest is the distribution of consumer benefits. Consumers in the relatively
economically advanced countries of the United States, Canada, the EU, Argentina, Australia,
Japan and South Korea receive additional surpluses totaling about US$398 million, or about 19%
of the improvement in consumer surpluses. The remaining 81% of improved consumer surplus is
enjoyed by developing countries/regions, where it is most needed.
Results for Scenarios 2, 3, and 4 also show large gains for consumers. In Scenarios 2 and
3, the United States, Canada, Argentina, and China adopt GM wheat production. On the
consumer side, Scenario 2 assumes only partial acceptability. In Scenario 3, we assume full
consumer acceptance, and Scenario 4 has all exporters and China producing GM wheat.
Accordingly, the gains in consumer welfare in Scenario 2 are smaller than Scenario 3 and
smaller in Scenario 3 than in Scenario 4. In all three  cases, however, collectively producers are
unambiguously harmed by the GM adoption. This is due to wheat price falling more than the
reduced cost of production, even for U.S. producers. In net, all these scenarios result in improved
total welfare. Scenario 2, with partial consumer acceptance, yields almost US$1.3 billion in
additional surplus. Scenario 3, with full consumer acceptance, yields US$1.7 billion in additional
surplus. The largest gain, in Scenario 4, is almost US$2.3 billion. Again, the vast majority of
benefits are enjoyed by consumers in developing countries. Consumers in these countries enjoy
79.5%, 75.8%, and 75.9% of the increased consumer surpluses under Scenarios 2, 3, and 4,
respectively. In contrast, developing countries’ producers suffer 31.3%, 30.0%, and 77.2% of the
total reductions in surpluses under these three scenarios. The large losses suffered by developing
countries in Scenario 4 are due in part to the assumption that there is little incentive for these
producers to adopt GM wheat. As non-labor input use, including herbicides, tends to be lower
than for industrialized countries, cost-savings associated with GM wheat are likely to be very
small and may be more than offset by any increase in germplasm costs. As seen in these results,
U.S. producers gain from GM adoption in all scenarios except 4, due to relatively large cost
savings enjoyed by U.S. producers from GM adoption. These cost savings are, however, justified
due to the relatively large dependence of U.S. producers on chemical inputs, including
herbicides.15
Table 9. Counter-factual Changes in Producer and Consumer Surpluses 
Country
/Region
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4




316.31 -4.17 98.99 79.68 189.50 343.84 -40.95 454.54
Canada -55.79 22.10 -94.70 45.49 -119.10 95.87 -199.41 126.82
EU -347.32 300.63 -704.57 610.75 -917.78 796.25 -742.60 1,052.86
Australia -83.65 18.48 -169.57 37.65 -220.80 49.17 -183.56 65.17
Argentina -51.90 19.06 -36.48 38.78 -69.65 50.59 -115.31 66.97
Algeria 0.00 14.60 0.00 29.63 0.00 38.60 0.00 50.99
Brazil -9.31 34.18 -12.57 46.23 -18.38 67.76 -26.37 97.58
China -455.76 468.06 -223.11 950.75 -514.69 1,239.44 -917.10 1,638.70
Egypt -19.94 43.20 -45.64 99.12 -62.33 135.58 -82.25 179.21
Japan 0.00 26.80 0.00 54.39 0.00 70.86 0.00 86.08
S. Korea 0.00 15.48 0.00 31.44 0.00 40.99 0.00 54.21
Mexico -22.45 35.20 -30.62 48.05 -35.19 55.24 -46.46 73.01
Morocco -12.86 21.62 -26.08 43.92 -33.97 57.26 -44.86 75.70
FSU -267.79 278.34 -542.47 565.87 -706.03 738.06 -931.35 976.48
Tunisia 0.00 3.28 0.00 7.02 0.00 9.60 0.00 12.68
Taiwan 0.00 4.18 0.00 8.15 0.00 10.64 0.00 14.08
Venezuela 0.00 5.91 0.00 8.07 0.00 9.28 0.00 12.26
ROW -655.12 820.02 -1,328.33 1,666.31 -1,729.79 2,172.76 -2,283.59 2,873.58
TOTALS -1,665.57 2,126.98 -3,115.16 4,371.30 -4,238.22 5,981.80 -5,613.81 7,910.94
NET 461.41 1,256.13 1,743.58 2,297.1316
Table 10. GM Wheat Production and Consumption 
Country/
Region
Consumption of GM Wheat
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 Scenario 5
--------------------------------------------1000 MT----------------------------------------




Argentina 4,728.01 4,741.43 4,759.96
Algeria 3,109.23
Brazil 5,398.60 5,398.60 5,398.60
China 114,444.70 114,374.69 115,924.27
Egypt 6,806.86 6,842.68 6,866.01 6,893.90 6,804.87
Japan 6,067.29
S. Korea 3,838.16
Mexico 1,871.12 1,877.10 1,880.44 1,888.68
Morocco 2,197.92
FSU 3,999.88
Tunisia 397.29 805.29 805.29
Taiwan 989.75 1,000.14 954.93
Venezuela 864.65 865.73 866.33 867.82 864.54
ROW 33,691.95 35,778.72 36,547.79 42,987.45 33,691.95
                                     Production of GM Wheat                                            
United States 44,224.32 36,434.77 63,200.04 62,867.05 42,316.29
Canada 7,239.98 22,817.80 22,762.88
EU 87,145.58
Australia 20,922.81
Argentina 12,213.39 12,149.14 12,060.40
China 114,444.70 114,374.69 114,278.0017




























Results in Scenarios 2, 3, and 4 are counter to those found by Falck-Zepeda et al. (2000a)
and Moschini et al. for glyphosate-tolerant soybeans and Falck-Zepeda et al. (2000a,b) for Bt
cotton. They report that consumers and adopting producers all benefit from the introduction of
GM soybeans and cotton. Our simulation results in lower surpluses to producers following
adoption of GM wheat by multiple producing nations. While counter to results for other GM
crops, the result is economically plausible. Consider the profit function of country i:
where output   is an increasing function of technology parameter  , the price received   is a qi γi pi
decreasing function of all other producing nations’ output, and total cost is increasing in output.
The change in profits to i due to a technology change in j is:
The first term in brackets is the change in profit due to a decrease in the equilibrium price that i
receives as technology improves in j. The second term in the brackets is the change in i’s
revenue due to the technology adoption by j. As j increases output due to technology adoption,
this increases world supply and decreases the residual demand available to i. The final term is
the change in i’s total costs due to j’s adoption. For i…j, this term is negative. The net change in
profit, when i…j, is clearly negative. In Scenario 1, this is effect on profits for all countries other
than the United States. If i = j, the total effect must be positive to induce change. This is the
effect on U.S. profits in Scenario 1 and can be seen in Figure 1a.. In Figure 1a, country i alone
adopts GM wheat. This adoption results in a increase supply from si
0 to si
1. Price decreases from
P
0 to P
1. The result is that country i’s producer surplus decreases by P
0ACP
1 and increases by
0CB. In net, country i enjoys a net positive change in producer surplus.
Now consider the impact on i of multiple countries, including possibly i, of technology
adoption:
In this case, even though i adopts the technology, the overall impact on the price i receives may
offset the benefits from adopting the technology. The total change in output for an individual
adopter may even be negative. The reduction in an adopter’s surplus can be seen graphically in
Figure 1b. In Figure 1b, country i adopts a new technology causing i’s supply function to change
from si
0 to si
1. However, as other countries adopt the technology, the world’s supply function
changes from S
0 to S
2. The resulting change in producer surplus is equal to the area OFE -
P
2P
0AF, which in this case is negative. Note, however, that the reduction in surplus is less than it
would be if country i did not adopt the technology while other producing countries did.18
Figure 1a.  Impact of U.S. Adoption of GM Wheat
Figure 1b. Impact of U.S. and Multiple Country Adoption of GM Wheat19
One final note on these simulations, in Scenarios 1, 2, and 3, EU producers are hurt more
than EU consumers benefit. This is due to the assumption that EU producers will be prohibited
from adopting GM wheat varieties. Since the EU is constrained from importing GM wheat, no
GM consumption occurs in the EU. When EU producers are allowed to produce GM wheat, as in
Scenario 4, net EU welfare increases, although EU producers still have lower surpluses relative
to the baseline.
In Scenario 5, we investigate the impact of lost U.S. export markets in response to U.S.
adoption. As is mentioned previously, there are concerns that importers of U.S. wheat may lose
confidence in the United State’s ability to maintain segregated market channels for GM and non-
GM wheat. This loss of confidence could lead to some importers shifting away from U.S. wheat
to wheat from non-GM producing countries. To simulate this effect, we allow U.S. production of
GM wheat while restricting exports to one of the U.S. importers (Mexico) under the baseline to
be equal to zero. That is, we use Scenario 1 parameter values and fix U.S. exports to Mexico to
zero. The results are somewhat surprising. Initially, we expected the United States to lose
producer surplus as the closest export market (from the baseline) was lost. However, the
reduction in production costs and increased sales of GM wheat exported elsewhere more than
offset the lost revenue. The resulting increase in U.S. producer surplus is US$319.15 million. We
also initially expect Canadian producers to enjoy an increase in surplus. Even though Canada is
able to increase exports to Mexico, Canadian producers suffer a loss of US$49.99 million due to
reduced wheat prices in their other export markets. The U.S. share of the export market is very
large, about 36.6% in the baseline. The reduction in U.S. production costs results in a significant
reduction in world wheat prices. Producers in Mexico enjoy an increase in surplus, as the local
price of wheat increases, of US$9.28 million, while Mexican consumers lose US$14.51 million.
Producers worldwide lose almost US$1.6 billion and consumers worldwide gain over US$2.0
billion, for a net benefit of US$437.0 million.
Summary and Conclusions
Modeling of planned GM crop introductions is troublesome. Data on both production and
consumption do not exist, precluding the use of econometric methods. We propose a method that
utilizes elasticity estimates from existing crop varieties and composite supply and demand
functions. These composite functions allow for differences in the marginal cost of producing GM
vs. non-GM varieties and in the marginal benefits from consuming GM vs. non-GM varieties.
We use the model to investigate international trade of wheat following GM wheat introductions.
Using planned GM wheat releases, we demonstrate the impact on international trade
flows for five plausible scenarios. The results indicate that the United States may have a first-
mover advantage even when importers of U.S. wheat do not accept GM wheat. This calls into
question recent efforts by some state legislatures, such as North Dakota, to ban production of
GM wheat varieties. If the savings in production costs are large enough, even the loss of some
large export markets may not offset these cost savings. In the scenarios considered, U.S.
producers enjoy additional surplus in all but the most widespread adoption scenario. As Canada,
Argentina, and China, currently large producers of other GM crops (corn, soybeans, and/or
canola), adopt GM wheat, the U.S. advantage diminishes. Add adoption by the EU and Australia
and U.S. producers are harmed relative to the baseline. The widespread adoption of GM wheat
reduces world wheat prices to a level where all producing nations lose surplus. In all the20
scenarios considered here, GM wheat introductions result in  large consumer surplus increases.
These gains more than offset aggregate producer losses. These results confirm that the long-run
impact of biotechnology is to the benefit of consumers world wide.21
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